Keynesian Economics provides a wide-ranging critical examination of the presuppositions and procedures of Keynesian analysis. The result is both a clear guide to modern macro-economic theory and policy and a revealing exercise in the recent history of ideas - ideas which are highly contentious and still deeply influential. "(Alan) Coddington made several substantive contributions to the understanding of Keynesian economics which established his fame not merely in the UK but in major centres of economics around the world." The Times

The rise of game theory has made bargaining one of the core issues in economic theory. Written at a theoretical and conceptual level, this book develops a framework for the analysis of bargaining processes. The framework focuses on the dynamic of the bargaining process, which is in contrast to much previous theoretical work on the subject, and most notably to the approaches stemming from game theory. Chapters include: decision-making and expectations in theories of bargaining; decision-making and expectations in a game theory model; limitations of the environment concept; game theory as a basis for a theory of bargaining; the decision/expectation/adjustment approach; the adjustment process; direct interdependence and the consistency of decisions.

A "tour de force" of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs--individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts--to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions.

The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.

The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

"Alan Coddington" received his Ph.D. from the University of York where the research for this book was conducted. He is lecturer in economics, Queen Mary College, London, and is co-author of "The Elementary Ideas of Game Theory."

"G. L. S. Shackle" (1903-1992) was Brunner Professor of Economic Science at the University of Liverpool and was widely known for a succession of major contributions to economic studies, including "Expectation in Economics, Economics for Pleasure, A Scheme of Economic Theory," and "The Years of High Theory."

A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs--individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts--to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions. The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach. The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

Keynesian Economics provides a wide-ranging critical examination of the presuppositions and procedures of Keynesian analysis. The result is both a clear guide to modern macro-economic theory and policy and a revealing exercise in the recent history of ideas - ideas which are highly contentious and still deeply influential. "(Alan) Coddington made several substantive contributions to the understanding of Keynesian economics which established his fame not merely in the UK but in major centres of economics around the world." The Times

The rise of game theory has made bargaining one of the core issues in economic theory. Written at a theoretical and conceptual level, the book develops a framework for the analysis of bargaining processes. The framework focuses on the dynamic of the bargaining process, which is in contrast to much previous theoretical work on the subject, and most notably to the approaches stemming from game theory. Chapters include: * Decision-Making and Expectations in Theories of Bargaining * Decision-Making and Expectations in a Game Theory Model * Limitations of the Environment Concept * Game Theory as a Basis for a Theory of Bargaining * The Decision/Expectation/adjustment Approach * The Adjustment Process * Direct Interdependence and the Consistency of Decisions